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ABSTRACT
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1 Introduction
The explosive growth of the credit derivative market, and the ensuing economic crisis, have
generated much interest in the pricing and hedging of credit derivatives. This market is com-
posed of both single-name products, such as the credit default swap (CDS), and multi-name
products such as the CDX index basket default swap and tranches based on this index. While
the spread on the CDX index can be mostly determined by observing the CDS spreads on
the 125 underlying rms that compose the index, the pricing of CDX tranche spreads depends
crucially on how one models default correlation. That is, whereas the pricing of the CDX index
depends only on the marginal default probabilities of the individual rms, the pricing of the
tranches depends on their joint probability distribution.
One framework often used for determining spreads on individual corporate bonds is the
so-called structural model of default (Merton (1974)), which is based on the insights of Black
and Scholes (1973). Risk neutral dynamics are specied for rm value, and default is assumed
to occur at maturity if rm value falls below a default boundary, which in the original model
is specied to equal the face value of debt outstanding. One interesting prediction of this
framework is that spreads depend only on the rm's total variance, and not on the fraction of
variance due to market risk and idiosyncratic risk.1 This is because only the marginal default
probability is needed to determine bond or CDS spreads.
In contrast, because CDX tranche spreads depend on correlation, their prices are rather
sensitive to the composition of market and idiosyncratic risks of the underlying rms. One of
the rst frameworks for modeling default correlation were the so-called copula models (Vasicek
(1987), Li (2000)). These models are eectively structural models of default embedded within
a CAPM framework to model default correlation. In particular, the standard copula model can
be interpreted as modeling returns as a sum of two factors: a market factor and an idiosyncratic
factor. Just as in the standard structural model, default occurs if the the sum of these two
factors drops below a specied default boundary. The level of correlation is driven by the
relative weights specied on the market and idiosyncratic components. Unfortunately, the
original copula framework is not dynamically consistent. For example, when pricing tranches
with dierent maturities, the standard copula approach has been to specify a dierent default
boundary location and a dierent market beta for each maturity, and then assume that default
1Note that if we condition on the P -measure default probability instead of the initial leverage ratio, then the
fraction of risk due to systematic risk would matter. Indeed, consider two rms that have the same total risk,
default probability and recovery rate. The rm with higher beta (and hence higher expected return) will need
to start with higher leverage to have the same default probability as the low-beta rm. As such, the higher
beta-rm will command a higher spread (Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2008)).
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can occur only at the maturity of the security in question. Moreover, copula models are
inherently static, and thus cannot be used, for example, to price options on CDO's (Due
(2004)).
In the original Gaussian copula models, both market and idiosyncratic factors were assumed
to be normally distributed. Just as it has become standard to quote option prices in terms
of its Black/Scholes implied volatility (in spite of the well-documented aws in the model's
predictions), it has become standard to quote correlations implied from the Gaussian copula.
Many improvements to the Gaussian copula have been suggested to improve upon its empirical
failures.2
In a recent inuential paper, Coval, Jurek and Staord (CJS, 2009) investigate the pricing
of CDO tranches within a copula framework by using S&P 500 option prices to identify the
market component of returns. Their approach is motivated by Breeden and Litzenberger
(1978), who show how state prices can be extracted from option prices.3 Given state prices,
CJS then calibrate the idiosyncratic component of returns from observed equity returns, and
the location of the default boundary so that their model matches perfectly the ve-year CDX
index (i.e., the risk-neutral expected loss on the index). They nd that observed spreads on the
equity tranche are too high, and observed spreads on more senior tranches are too low relative
to those predicted by their model.4 Since their results seem robust along many dimensions,
CJS conclude that sellers of senior protection were writing insurance contracts on \economic
catastrophe bonds" without realizing the magnitude of systematic risk they were exposed to,
and thus not demanding adequate compensation for that risk. They conjecture that agents
had purchased senior claims solely with regard to their credit rating (which reects their P -
measure default probability), but ignored the large systematic risk associated with holding a
senior claim written on an underlying diversied portfolio. Their ndings are puzzling, since
traders in the CDX market are typically thought of as being rather sophisticated. Thus it
would be surprising to nd them accepting so much risk without fair compensation.
In this paper, we also investigate the relative prices of S&P 500 index options and spreads
on the CDX index and tranches. An important dierence between our framework and that
of CJS (and most other copula models) is that we specify a fully dynamic model that allows
2See, for example, Andersen and Sidenius (2004), Hull and White (2004), Due and Garleanu (2001).
3Since it is well-known that fat tails in the common density are needed to t tranche prices. CJS propose
an `out-of-sample' calibration of the common market factor distribution. Other approaches to match fat tails
includes Hull and White (2004), who use a double t-distribution.
4For their benchmark case, spreads are approximately two-times too small for the 3-7% tranche, four-times
too small for the 7-10% tranche, ve-times too small for the 10-15% tranche, and three-times too small for the
15-30% tranche.
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us to jointly and consistently price these securities across the maturity spectrum. Following
Black and Cox (1976), we specify the default event as the rst time rm value drops below
the default boundary, instead of limiting default to occur only at maturity. This allows us to
account for the possibility of early default, which can signicantly impact the cash ows of
protection buyers and sellers of CDX tranches.
While there are many dierences between our framework and theirs, the most crucial
distinction that drives our results is that CJS calibrate their model to match only the ve-year
CDX index spread, whereas we calibrate our model to match the entire term structure of CDX
index spreads { that is, spreads across all maturities. Calibrating to shorter horizon CDX
index spreads is important because they contain pertinent information regarding the timing
of expected defaults and the specication of idiosyncratic dynamics. Using this calibration
approach, we match the time series of tranche spreads well, both during and prior to the crisis
period, thus providing a resolution to the puzzle of CJS.
To gain some intuition for why it is essential to calibrate the model to match the term
structure of CDX index levels, we recall a well-documented failure of (diusion-based) struc-
tural models of default: they dramatically underpredict default rates for investment grade debt
at short maturities. This is true both under the risk-neutral measure, where structural models
predict negligible credit spreads at short maturity (Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984), Eom,
Helwege Huang (2005)), and under the true measure (Leland (2004)). To match short-term
spreads on investment grade debt, it is necessary to include idiosyncratic jumps into rm dy-
namics. (e.g., Zhou (2001)). We calibrate idiosyncratic jump size and intensities to match
observed CDX index spreads at short horizons. In sum then, whereas S&P 500 option prices
are useful for identifying market dynamics, the term structure of CDX index levels is useful
for identifying idiosyncratic dynamics.
Calibrating the idiosyncratic component of return dynamics to the term structure of CDX
index spreads impacts tranche spreads in two important ways. First, it increases (risk neutral)
expected losses (i.e., defaults) at shorter horizons. Without this calibration approach, defaults
are backloaded, that is, occur later than actual market expectations. The timing of defaults
is especially crucial for the equity tranche, where the buyer of protection gets to reduce her
payments as soon as the rst default occurs. This helps explain why the implied equity tranche
spread in the CJS framework tends to be too low relative to the market quote. Moreover, since
their model matches the ve year CDX index (and therefore, ve year risk neutral expected
losses), the downward bias on the equity tranche spread automatically generates an upward
bias on the spreads of the senior tranches. It is interesting to note that, in practice, the timing
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of defaults is understood to be so crucial for the determination of the equity tranche spread
that it is common to contractually specify its cash ows in a dierent manner (i.e., with an up-
front premium) compared to the other tranches (i.e., full-running premium) so as to reduce its
sensitivity to the timing of defaults.5 As we demonstrate below, our model matches observed
equity tranche spreads well for both forms of contractual payments.
The second important way our calibration approach impacts tranche spreads is by increas-
ing the proportion of risk that is idiosyncratic compared to systematic. The intuition for how
this impacts tranche spreads stems from the central limit theorem: if in fact all risk were id-
iosyncratic, then due to the large number (namely, 125) of rms in the index, the distribution
of fractional losses would be tightly peaked around expected losses (which were below the 3%
equity loss detachment point during the period studied by CJS ). As one increases the pro-
portion of systematic risk, the loss distribution widens because losses become more dependent
on market performance. Below we show that if the model is not calibrated to match the term
structure of CDX index spreads, then there is an insucient level of idiosyncratic risk specied,
and the loss distribution is not suciently peaked. This forces too much of the loss distribution
(compared to the market's expectations) to fall above the 3% equity loss detachment point,
implying too high of a probability where sellers of protection of the more senior tranches will
have to pay out, in turn biasing upward tranche spreads for the more senior tranches. Again,
since CJS calibrate their model to match the 5 year CDX index, the upward bias in senior
tranche spreads automatically generates a downward bias in equity tranche spreads.
One more issue that arises in our investigation is that we show one cannot uniquely de-
termine market dynamics from option contracts that are actually traded. This is because the
strike prices of traded options do not span far enough in the moneyness dimension to identify
the (risk neutral) probabilities of catastrophic crashes. As such, there are many choices of
market dynamics that can be specied that generate nearly identical prices for those options
with strikes that are actually traded, but generate very dierent prices for the super-senior
tranche. Therefore, we calibrate our model to match the super-senior tranche spread, and
price all other tranche spreads out-of-sample.6
While CJS calibrate state prices only for a maturity of ve years, our framework requires a
5As we discuss in equations (14)-(15) below, instead of setting the equity tranche premium so that the present
value of the premium equals the present value of the protection, often there is also an up-front premium paid
to sellers of equity tranche protection.
6We are condent we could match tranche spreads even better than what is shown below if we were to
also calibrate market dynamics to match other tranche spreads. But such an additional exercise would mostly
mimic the contributions inherent in papers such as Mortensen (2006), Longsta and Rajan (2008), and Eckner
(2009), who have already demonstrated the ability of a few in-sample state variables to match the cross section
of tranche spreads well.
4
dynamic model capable of producing state prices for all maturities. As documented previously
in the literature, it is not a trivial task to specify market dynamics to match long maturity
options, as observed option implied volatilities fail to atten out as maturity increases, in
contrast to the predictions of most models.7 To circumvent this problem, we allow the dividend
yield to be stochastic. It turns out that this can have a signicant impact on the implied
volatility surface, especially if the parameterization implies non-stationary dynamics under
the risk neutral measure.8 While non-stationarity may at rst seem undesirable, it has a
theoretical justication. Indeed, we show in the Appendix that, in the habit formation model
of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the endogenously determined dividend yield is a function of
their `consumption surplus' habit variable and that this variable exhibits non-stationarity under
the risk neutral measure (even though it is stationary under the historical measure). Moreover,
this feature is responsible for their model's ability to capture long term predictability of market
returns.
There is a large and increasing literature on correlated defaults.9 Our contribution with
respect to the literature is to investigate the relative pricing across the stock option and CDO
markets.10 Further, our fully dynamic and self-consistent framework allows us to investigate
the sensitivity of standard approximations made in the literature. For example, we nd that
accounting for rm heterogeneity, dynamic capital structure, `industry correlations', or stochas-
tic interest rates has only a secondary impact on tranche pricing. In contrast, calibrating to
the term structure of CDX spreads is essential for jointly modeling S&P 500 option prices and
CDX tranche spreads.
The rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we propose a joint model for equity index
options and CDO tranches. In Section 3 we discuss the data and our calibration approach.
In Section 4 we report the results for option prices as well as the cross sectional implications
for tranche prices of our various model specications. In Section 5 we investigate the time
series properties of our model. In Section 6, we investigate the robustness of our results. We
conclude in Section 7.
7See Backus, Foresi and Wu (1997), Das and Sundaram (1999), Carr and Wu (2003).
8With that said, our results for tranche spreads are not driven by our choice of modeling market returns, as
we demonstrate in the robustness section.
9Examples include Due and Garleanu (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege (2003), Hull and
White (2004), Longsta, Mithal and Neis (2005), Mortensen (2006), Longsta and Rajan (2008), Giesecke and
Goldberg (2005), Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2006), Das et al (2006), Das et al (2007), Due, Saita and Wang
(2007), Jorion and Zhang (2009)
10Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout (2008) show option prices on individual rms are consistent with prices
from the CDS market.
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2 A joint structural model for equity index options and CDO
tranches
This paper investigates the relative pricing of CDX tranche spreads and S&P 500 option prices
within a structural framework. In order to do so, we need a model of market returns and
individual rm level returns. In this section, we introduce an ane option pricing model
(SVDCJ) for market returns that extends the standard SVCJ model of Broadie, Chernov and
Johannes (2009) to better account for some features inherent in the data of long-maturity
option prices. We then introduce a CAPM-like structural model for rm level returns that
allows us to price basket CDS and CDO tranches.
2.1 Market dynamics for long maturity option prices
There is a long tradition, since Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), to extract implied state price
densities from quoted option prices. One common approach, followed by CJS, is to use a `local
volatility' model, which species a exible form for the implied volatility function which is
then calibrated to match observed option prices across strikes and maturity.11 This approach
is particularly well suited when the amount of data is large, and tends to provide accurate
estimates for the implied density if the range of interpolation/extrapolation is not too far
from strikes for which option prices are available. Unfortunately, to study tranche prices, and
especially the super-senior tranche, we will have to `extrapolate' the density to regions that are
far from any strikes of quoted option prices. Therefore, we prefer to use a fully dynamic model
where return dynamics under the risk neutral measure are specied. This approach guarantees
that our `extrapolated' volatility surface is both consistent (i.e., arbitrage-free) and generated
from a model with economically motivated dynamics. One nice feature (and necessary for our
needs) of having a fully dynamic option pricing model is that, once calibrated, we can obtain
the state price density for all strikes and all maturities. In contrast, CJS focus on state prices
for the 5-year maturity only, and specify a model where this information is sucient to price
tranche spreads.
There is a large literature on testing parametric option pricing models. Early papers
that test various specications of option pricing models include Bates (2000), Pan (2002),
Eraker, Johannes, Polson (2003), Eraker (2004), Anderson and Andreasen (2000).12 The recent
11See, for example, Derman and Kani (1994), Dupire (1994) Rubinstein (1994), Dumas, Fleming and Whaley
(1998).
12More recently, researchers have investigated whether option prices are consistent with asset prices in dierent
markets. For example, Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout (2008) demonstrate that the implied volatility smirk
of option prices on individual stocks are mostly consistent with credit spreads on the same rm.
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paper by Broadie, Chernov and Johannes (BCJ 2009) presents an encompassing test of various
specications proposed in the literature using an extensive data set on S&P 500 futures options.
Their preferred model is the so-called SVCJ model which allows for stochastic volatility and
correlated jumps in both stock returns and volatility processes. We therefore choose to build
on their preferred model, which we extend by introducing a stochastic dividend yield. BCJ
and indeed most of the literature has focused on options with relatively short maturity (i.e.,
less than 6 months). However, since our focus is the pricing of 5-year CDX tranches, it is
necessary to back out long-maturity state prices, implying the need to look at long-maturity
option prices. The maturity of exchange-traded options on the S&P 500 is typically limited to
under three years, but on the OTC market it is possible to obtain longer dated options. CJS
calibrate their model to ve year maturity quotes obtained from Citigroup. We perform our
initial calibration by matching to the same prices as reported in CJS.
While the so-called SVCJ jump-diusion model performs very well at capturing time-series
and cross-sectional properties of option returns, it performs better for short-dated options. For
longer maturity options the model-predicted implied volatility surface attens (see Figure 1),
in contradiction with the longer-term maturity option data available. This surprising pattern
found in long maturity option prices, that implied volatilities, expressed as a function of a
standard measure of moneyness, do not atten out, implies a violation of the central limit
theorem's underlying assumptions (Carr and Wu (2003)). Indeed, the slope and curvature of
the volatility `smirk' are mostly controlled by the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution
of market prices. But if the central limit theorem holds, it predicts that the distribution of
log-returns should converge to normal over suciently long maturity.13 In order to overcome
the central limit theorem's implications, Carr and Wu (2003) propose a log-stable process
with innite second moments. While their model matches option prices well, one unattractive
feature of their model is that the variance of log returns is innite in their model (despite
the fact that all moments of the spot price and therefore option prices are nite). This could
lead to innite prices of certain volatility derivatives for example. Instead, we propose an
alternative mechanism to t longer maturity implied volatility skews.
While there are many possible choices (e.g., state variables driving interest rates, volatility,
intensity, etc.), here we consider a state variable that has been mostly ignored in the options
literature, even though it is fundamental in the returns literature: the dividend yield (i.e.,
the inverse of the price/dividend ratio that is the focus of many macro-nance papers such
as Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or Bansal and Yaron (2003)). As motivation, we note that
13See Das and Sundaram (1999), Backus, Foresi and Wu (2004).
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Figure 1: Implied volatility curves (IVF) as a function of moneyness for dierent maturities for
two dierent models: our non-stationary dividend yield model, and constant dividend yield.
We follow Carr and Wu(2003) denition of moneyness log(K=F )

p
T
. Note how the ve-year IVF
does not atten out compared to the three- and four-year for the non-stationary model, in
contrast to the constant dividend model.
in the habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the price-dividend ratio is a
function of a single state variable s, the so-called `surplus consumption ratio', whose dynamics
are stationary under the actual measure, but non-stationary under the risk-neutral measure.
(See Appendix 1). Therefore we introduce a stochastic dividend yield, with possible non-
stationary dynamics under the risk-neutral measure. Specically, we dene Mt as the value of
the market portfolio, Vt the volatility of the market, and (t) the dividend yield of the market.
We specify risk-neutral market dynamics as:
dMt
Mt
= (r   ) dt+
p
Vtdw
Q
1
+ (ey   1) dq   yQdt  (eyC   1) (dqC   QC dt) (1)
dVt = V (
V   Vt)dt+ V
p
Vt(dw
Q
1
+
p
1  2dwQ
2
) + yV dq (2)
dt = (
   t) dt+ 
p
Vt(1 dw
Q
1
+ 2 dw
Q
2
+
q
1  2
1
  2
2
dwQ
3
) + y

dq: (3)
Here, dwQ
1
and dwQ
2
are Brownian motions, and dq is a jump process with a constant jump
intensity Q. The market, the variance and the dividend yield jump contemporaneously.
The jump size of the volatility follows an exponential distribution, yV  exp(1=V ). The
jump size in market is originally assumed to be normal conditional on the jump size of Vt ,
yjyV  N
 
qyV + y ; y

. The jump size in dividend yield is assumed to be independent
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normal, y

 N(
d
; 
d
). The compensator for the jump in the market price is
y = E [e
y]  1 = e
y+
1
2
2y
1  qV
  1: (4)
We note that this model is the standard SVCJ model studied in the literature (e.g., BCJ
(2009)) extended for a stochastic dividend yield with a correlated jump. We therefore refer to
this model as the SVDCJ model. We note that in addition we have explicitly added a jump qC
with deterministic jump size yC in the market dynamics, even though it could be subsumed in
the standard jump dq, because we want to emphasize the importance of a `catastrophic' jumps
for the pricing of super-senior tranches in our calibrations. The importance of catastrophic
jumps for asset pricing has been emphasized in Rietz (1983) and more recently revisited in
Barro (2008), Backus, Chernov and Martin (2009) and others. We demonstrate below that
there are many calibrations of this model that would match well the option prices for those
strikes that are actually traded. Therefore, in order to uniquely identify market dynamics, we
calibrate the model to match the data on both the super-senior tranche spreads and S&P 500
options, leaving all other tranche spreads to be priced out-of-sample.
Given that the model is specied to have ane dynamics, it follows that the characteristic
function is exponential ane (Due, Pan and Singleton (2000)). As such, European option
prices can be solved numerically by applying the Fast Fourier Transformation(FFT) on the log
market characteristic function (Heston (1996), Carr and Madan (1998)). The solution of the
log market characteristic function is given in the Appendix 2.
2.2 Firm dynamics and structural default model
Given the market dynamics, we assume that individual rm dynamics are specied as:
dA
A
+ A dt  rdt = 
p
Vtdw
Q
1
+ (ey   1) dq   yQdt

+ (eyC   1) (dqC   QC dt)
+i dwi + (e
yi   1) (dqi   Qi dt): (5)
This is basically the standard `CAPM' like equation for individual rm's asset return, where
 denotes the loading of each rm's asset return dynamics on the market return. The only
dierence from CAPM is that we assume each rm has a loading of 1 on the catastrophic event.
That is, unlike the standard market risk, we assume that all rms have the same exposure to
`catastrophic events'. The idiosyncratic jump size and intensity are constants. Under these
specications, the log market and log asset have dynamics
d logMt =

r   t  
1
2
Vt   yQ   (eyC   1)QC

dt+
p
Vt dw
Q
1
+ y dq + yC dqC
9
d logAt =

r   A  
1
2
2Vt  
1
2
2
i
  yQ   (eyC   1)QC   (eyi   1)Qi

dt
+
p
Vt dw
Q
1
+ i dwi + log [1 +  (e
y   1)] dq + yC dqC + yi dqi : (6)
Following Black and Cox (1976) and others, we specify that default occurs the rst time
rm value falls below a default threshold AB . Therefore default arrival time for the typical
rm i with asset dynamics Ai(t) is dened as:
i = infft : Ai(t)  ABg: (7)
We assume that upon default the debt-holder recover a fraction of the remaining asset value
(1  `)AB where ` is the loss rate.
2.3 Basket CDS index and CDO tranche spreads
We consider next the pricing of baskets of CDS and CDO tranches. Eventually, we want to
use the model to price the DJ CDX North American Investment Grade Index and the tranches
associated with it. This index is a basket CDS written on an equally weighted portfolio of 125
investment grade names. It can essentially be thought of as a portfolio of 125 liquid ve-year
credit default swaps (CDS) with investment grade status. The spread of a CDS on a rm
is closely related to the credit spread of a bond on the same rm.14 The running spread on
the CDX index is closely related to a weighted average of CDS spreads.15 To determine this
spread, the present value of cash ows that go to the protection buyer and protection seller
are set equal to each other. These cash ows are specied as
V
idx;prem
(S) = S E
"
MX
m=1
e rtm (1  n(tm))  +
Z tm
tm 1
du e ru (u  tm 1) dnu
#
(8)
V
idx;prot
= E
Z T
0
e rt dLt

: (9)
Here, we have dened the number of defaults in the portfolio by n(t) =
P
i 1fitg
, and the
cumulative loss in the portfolio as:
L(t) =
X
i
1fitg
Ri(i) (10)
14Empirically, CDS spreads are close to credit spreads only when the risk-free benchmark is estimated to be
well above Treasuries. In normal times, the swap/Libor curve is a better proxy than the Treasury curve. See,
for example, Blanco Brennan and Marsh (2005). Though during the 2007-2009 crisis we have seen very negative
basis for investment grade spreads.
15There are some technical dierences between the CDX contract specication and a portfolio of CDS. Most
notably, the fact that the CDX is settled upfront based on a xed running coupon spread (see Collin-Dufresne
(2008)). This has only a minor impact on our analysis below, however and therefore we ignore them.
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where Ri(t) is the recovery rate on rm i when it defaults at time t.
In addition to the CDX index, tranches based on the index have also been created. Each
tranche is characterized by its attachment points. For the CDX index, the dierent tranches are
0-3% (the equity tranche), 3-7% (mezzanine), 7-10%, 10-15%, 15-30% (senior), and 30-100%
(super-senior). The buyer of protection pays a periodic premium in return for compensation
if there are losses on the CDX index that fall within the range of the particular tranche.
Once again, the spread is determined by equating the present value of the protection leg and
premium leg.
The tranche loss as a function of portfolio loss is
Tj (L(t))  TKj 1 ;Kj (L(t)) = max

min(L(t);Kj ) Kj 1 ; 0

(11)
= max

L(t) Kj 1 ; 0
 max L(t) Kj ; 0 : (12)
The initial value of the protection leg on tranche-j is
Protj (0; T ) = E
Q
Z T
0
e rt dTj (L(t))

(13)
In terms of the tranche spread Sj , the initial value of the premium leg on tranche-j (except
for the equity and super-senior tranches) is
Premj (0; T ) = SjE
Q
"
MX
m=1
e rtm
Z tm
tm 1
du
 
Kj  Kj 1   Tj (L(u))
#
: (14)
There are two standard practices followed for the premium on the equity tranche. One is a
so-called \full running premium" as in equation (14). In the other approach, which is more
common, the equity tranche premium has a so-called \up-front premium" U combined with a
set running premium of 500bps:
Prem1(0; T ) = UK1 + 0:05E
Q
"
MX
m=1
e rtm
Z tm
tm 1
du (K1  K0   T1(L(u)))
#
: (15)
The reason for these two dierent practices is that the pricing of the equity tranche using
equation (14) is known to be very sensitive to the timing of defaults. To see this intuitively,
note that the quarterly payment drops from (0:03)
 
S
4

before any defaults to (0:03  (1 R)125 )
 
S
4

after the rst default. For a standard recovery rate of R = 0:4, this is approximately a 16%
drop in payments. The fact that the market is so concerned about the timing of defaults for
the equity tranche that it has created a dierent cash ow for it emphasizes that the market is
very aware of this sensitivity, and no doubt calibrating their models to incorporate information
regarding this.
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Finally, the super-senior tranche premium is specied by
Prem6(0; T ) = S6E
Q
"
MX
m=1
e rtm
Z tm
tm 1
du (K6  K5   nuR  T6(L(u)))
#
: (16)
We note that high recoveries `hurt' the super-senior tranches as the principal gets reduced
by the amount recovered.16 Following CJS, we rst focus on the period September 2004 to
September 2007. We then investigate how the model performs during the crisis.
3 Data and calibration
3.1 Data
Our primary data include S&P 500 European option prices, the CDX North American Investment-
Grade Index, and tranche spreads written on this index for maturities of one to ve years. The
option data are from OptionMetrics. The CDX index and tranche data are from J.P. Morgan.
Our sample consists of two periods: the pre-crisis period (September 21, 2004 to September
20, 2007) and the crisis period (September 21, 2007 to September 20, 2008). The composition
of the CDX index is refreshed every six months. The pre-crisis period includes data from
Series 3 through Series 8, whereas the crisis period includes data from Series 9 through Se-
ries 10. To simplify the calibration and reduce bid-ask bounce error, we use only the closing
quotes on every Wednesday in the sample. We remove options with maturities less than one
year because the slope of the volatility smile of these options are highly sensitive to smaller
but more frequent jumps which have little impact on the risk-neutral distribution of market
values over long horizons.17 There are 206 weeks in our sample. The available options vary
across moneynesses and maturities (between 1 and 3 years). While we use this option data to
determine the time series of our state variables, we also use ve year option data from CJS to
calibrate the parameters of the model.
To identify asset betas, idiosyncratic volatilities and leverage ratios of rms in the collateral
pool, we use daily CRSP and quarterly/annual Compustat data from 2000 to 2008. We obtain
daily risk-free return from Ken French's website. Treasury yields are from FRED, the database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
16Technically if recovery amounts exceeded the notional of the super-senior tranche then the notional of the
adjacent senior tranche should be written down and so on. In practice, this is very unlikely to happen. The
model is easily amended to account for that, however.
17That is, to jointly match short and long-maturity options would necessitate us adding additional jumps
which are smaller in magnitude but more frequent. As has been shown in the previous literature, these jumps
have negligible impact on the prices of long dated options.
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3.2 Calibration of the option return model
First, we calibrate our SVDCJ option model to the 5-year index options (Series 4) from CJS.
Using estimates from BCJ, we set the correlation coecient between the market return and
the market variance to  =  0:48 and the volatility parameter of the market variance to
V = 0:2016. Theory implies that these two parameters should remain the same under both
the P-measure and Q-measures. We also choose the risk-free rate r = 0:05, and the average
market dividend yield  = 0:04. The rest of the parameters are chosen to minimize the
percentage root mean square error (RMSE) of the 13 implied volatilities. We x the initial
values of the state variables to their long run means V0 =
V and 0 =
. The calibrated
parameters correspond to \Estimate 1" in Table 1.
Parameter Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4
 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48
V 0.2016 0.2016 0.2016 0.2016
 0.1534 0.1608 0.1743 0.2465
q 0.0203 0.0199 -0.0509 -0.0576
y -0.2991 -0.2843 -0.4726 -0.3479
y 0.2445 0.2441 0.4609 0.3915
V 0.0037 0.0038 0.0132 0.0094
V 0.0035 0.0033 0.0099 0.0056
V 5.4368 5.3644 1.5442 2.1596
V0 0.0037 0.0038 0.0132 0.0094
 -0.5914 -0.5903 -0.4816 -0.4953
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
 0.0454 0.0423 0.0405 0.0304
1 -0.9054 -0.8968 -0.5056 -0.4135
2 -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0078 -0.0066
d 0.0002 0.0002 0.003 0.0007
d 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
r 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
yC 0 -2 0 -2
Q
C
0 0.00076 0 0.0066
Table 1: Calibration of market dynamics using two methods: The rst method uses option data
only, and sets the catastrophic jump size yC and intensity 
Q
C
to zero. The second method uses
both option data and the super-senior tranche spread, and calibrates the catastrophic jump
intensity to minimize percentage RMSE (jump size set to yC =  2). Both methods are applied
to the pre-crisis (Estimation 1 and 2) and the crisis (Estimation 3 and 4) data.
A few parameter estimates are worth mentioning. Consistent with BCJ, we nd an eco-
nomically insignicant point estimate for q . More importantly, the point estimate for the
mean reversion coecient on dividend yield 

is negative, implying non-stationarity. That is,
consistent with the ndings of Carr and Wu (2003), tting long maturity option data requires
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a violation of one of the assumptions underlying the central limit theorem. With that said, we
show in the robustness section that our main results regarding the CDX tranche spreads are
not driven by this result, and indeed similar results are obtained if we assume the dividend
yield is constant.
Figure 2 shows the t of the model for our calibration as well as the corresponding implied
risk-neutral distribution. It is apparent that the model does a very good job at tting the
sample of 13 long-dated implied volatilities obtained by CJS. We emphasize that since the
parameters are similar to those of BCJ, and that the stochastic dividend yield mainly impacts
long-dated option prices, we expect the model to also t short dated S&P 500 futures options
well.
The second column denoted by \Estimate 2" in Table 1 corresponds to a second calibration
where we set the size of the catastrophic jump to yC =  2:0 (which corresponds to a  87%
drop in price) and then choose its intensity Q
C
to match the average spread on the super-senior
tranche for pre-crisis period. The recovery rate for those rms that default due to this jump
is specied as 20% to capture the empirical nding that recovery rate is procyclical. (See, for
example, Altman et al (2005)). We will discuss this in greater detail below, but it is worth
emphasizing, as shown in Figure (2), that both calibrations imply almost identical option prices
for those strikes that are actually traded, that is, for option strikes with moneyness greater
than 0.7. Indeed, calibrating market dynamics to match the super-senior tranche impacts state
prices signicantly only for moneyness levels around 0.2 or lower. This is our rst indication
that one cannot `extrapolate' the information in option prices to deduce information regarding
the super-senior tranche. Instead, we calibrate our model to match the super-senior tranche,
and investigate the model implications for the other CDX tranches.
The third and fourth columns are parameter values for the model calibrated to match the
5-year options in September, 2008. The risk-neutral catastrophe jump intensity is calibrated to
the average spread of the super-senior tranche of CDX Series 10 (March, 2008 to September,
2008). The corresponding implied volatility curve and risk-neutral dynamics are shown in
Figure 3. Comparing these results to those of Figure 2, we nd rather dramatic changes to
market dynamics during the crisis.
3.3 Calibration of asset value process
The most crucial distinction between our calibration procedure and that of CJS is the following:
CJS assumes that idiosyncratic risk is driven by a diusion process, and then set the location
of the default boundary at each date to perfectly match the ve-year CDX index. In contrast,
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we assume idiosyncratic risk is driven by both diusions and jumps, and calibrate our model
to match the entire term structure of CDX indices. In particular, as in CJS, we use equity data
to specify the idiosyncratic diusion parameter. However, we set the idiosyncratic jump size to
yi =  2:0 (a value which basically guarantees default), and then calibrate the one-year, two-
year, three-year, and four-year intensities18 on the idiosyncratic jump, and the location of the
default boundary, to perfectly match the CDX indices at all ve of these horizons. We argue
that including jumps is essential, since it is well-documented that diusion-based structural
models of default for investment grade rms fail badly at capturing spreads (i.e, risk-neutral
expected losses) at short maturities. As we demonstrate below, the pricing of tranche spreads
is very sensitive to matching these (risk-neutral) expected loss rates.
To estimate asset beta, we take a weighted average of equity beta and debt beta. For each
publicly traded rm in the on-the-run CDX series, equity beta is estimated using backward-
looking 5-year daily equity returns prior to the rst trading date of the series. As shown in
Table 2, equity betas varied considerably over time, ranging from 0.82 to 0.99, and increased
monotonically as the crisis approached.19 Moreover, market volatility increased, and idiosyn-
cratic volatility decreased over our sample period. The time series of the fraction of systematic
versus idiosyncratic risk implied from our model calibrated to both options, CDX index and
tranches are shown in Figure 5. As discussed previously, the distribution of losses becomes
more peaked around expected losses as the fraction of idiosyncratic risk increases. This is
shown in Figure 4.
We estimate the beta of debt by regressing the excess returns of LQD (an ETF of investment
graded corporate bonds) on the excess returns of S&P 500 for the same window of each series
as we estimate the equity beta. The leverage ratio is dened as the book debt divided by the
sum of book debt plus market equity, where book debt is from quarterly Compustat, using the
short-term debt (DATA45) plus the long-term debt (DATA51). If any of these two numbers
are missing, we use the corresponding items in the annual data. The cross-sectional average
of leverage ratios are also displayed in Table 2.
3.4 Time Series of default boundary
Early papers (e.g., Merton (1974)) specied the default boundary to equal the face value (or
book value) of debt. However, there are at least three strands of literature that suggest the
location of the default boundary may be signicantly lower. First, the literature on optimal
18We set the ve-year intensity equal to the four-year intensity. This way, we have ve free parameters to
match the ve CDX index spreads.
19We emphasize that the change in beta over time is due in part to a change in composition of the index.
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Series Period Equity Leverage Market Idiosyncratic
Beta Ratio Volatility Asset Volatility
3 9/2004-3/2005 0.82 0.36 10.34 27.08
4 3/2005-9/2005 0.83 0.36 10.38 25.29
5 9/2005-3/2006 0.87 0.33 10.02 23.86
6 3/2006-9/2006 0.92 0.33 11.35 21.84
7 9/2006-3/2007 0.94 0.32 9.80 20.93
8 3/2007-9/2007 0.94 0.32 15.67 19.90
9 9/2007-3/2008 0.98 0.31 21.86 18.64
10 3/2008-9/2008 0.99 0.29 23.42 18.61
Table 2: Estimates of equity beta, leverage ratio, market and idiosyncratic volatility for each
six month period that a given series was on the run. The betas are estimated via CAPM
regression, based on backward-looking ve year daily stock returns and S&P 500 returns.
When estimating equity betas and leverage ratio, we include all publicly traded rms in the
collateral pool.
capital structure (e.g., Leland (1994)) predicts that equityholders may nd it optimal to cover
debt payments via equity issuance in order to keep their implicit option to the rm's cash
ows alive even if rm value falls well below the face value of debt. Second, since historical
recovery rates have averaged approximately 45%, default at the face value of debt would
imply bankruptcy costs of 55%, a number which is dicult to believe, since one would expect
workouts to occur more often if so much value was on the line. Furthermore, direct estimates
of bankruptcy costs are on the order of 20% (e.g., Andrade and Kaplan (1998)). Combining
these two numbers gives a prediction for the ratio of default boundary to face value of debt (F)
equal to
A
B
F =
0:45
1 0:2  0:56. Third, Leland (2004) nds that the standard structural model
of default under the historical measure is generally consistent with historical default rates (for
maturities greater than three years) if the default boundary is approximately 70% of the face
value of debt. Similar results are obtained by Davydenko (2008), who estimates this ratio to
be in the range
A
B
F 2 (56%; 70%).
As shown in Figure 6, the ratio of our calibrated default boundary to book value of debt
varies signicantly over our sample period, monotonically increasing from 57% at the beginning
of our sample to nearly 100% during the crisis.
In the calibrations below, we set the (risk-neutral expected) recovery rate to 40% for in-
dividual defaults, consistent with market convention, and slightly below the 45% historical
recovery rate on investment grade senior unsecured debt. However, there is evidence that
recovery is procyclical (e.g., Altman et al (2005)). As a recent example, the recovery rate on
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GM debt, whose default occurred during the crisis, was approximately 10%. Therefore, in our
benchmark model we set recovery rate to 20% in the event of a market collapse.
Finally, we note that the average risk-neutral intensity associated with market collapse is
Q
C
= 0:00076. That is, the market anticipates a catastrophic event to occur less than once per
thousand years. Although this intensity is miniscule, it has a signicant impact on the size of
the more senior tranche spreads.
4 Results
4.1 Average tranche spreads: pre-crisis period
In this section we report six sets of tranche spreads averaged over the pre-crisis period Septem-
ber 2004 - September 2007:
 The historical values;
 Benchmark model: Catastrophic jumps calibrated to match the super-senior tranche
spread; Idiosyncratic jumps and default boundary calibrated to match the 1-year, 2-
year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year CDX index spreads.
 Q
C
= 0: No catastrophic jumps; Idiosyncratic jumps and default boundary calibrated to
match the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year CDX index spreads;
 Q
i
= 0: Catastrophic jumps calibrated to match the super-senior tranche spread; No
idiosyncratic jumps; Default boundary calibrated to match only the 5Y CDX index.
 Q
C
= 0; Q
i
= 0: No catastrophic jumps; No idiosyncratic jumps; Default boundary
calibrated to match only the 5Y CDX index;
 The results reported by CJS
The results are given in Table 3. As shown in the last row, our framework generates errors that
are an order of magnitude smaller than errors reported by CJS. Even in absolute terms, our
framework performs well. As stated earlier, given the results of the previous literature (e.g.,
Longsta and Rajan (2008)), we are condent that the t could be improved even further if
we were to calibrate market dynamics to match, say, mezzanine tranche spreads, rather than
pricing them out-of-sample as we do here.
Here we use the results of the other three models to provide some intuition for why our
model performs so much better than that of CJS. We begin with the case closest to CJS;
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0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-15% 15-30% 30-100% 0-3% Upfrt
data 1472 135 37 17 8 4 0.34
benchmark 1449 113 25 13 8 4 0.33
Q
C
= 0 1669 133 21 6 1 0 0.40
Q
i
= 0 1077 206 70 32 12 4 0.22
Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0 1184 238 79 31 6 0 0.26
CJS 914 267 150 87 28 1 na
jCJS Dataj
jBenchmark Dataj 24.3 6 9.4 17.5 1 1
Table 3: Historical and model estimated average tranche spreads over the time interval Septem-
ber 2004 - September 2007 for four dierent models: i) benchmark, ii) benchmark without
catastrophic jump, iii) benchmark without idiosyncratic jumps, iv) benchmark without either
catastrophic jump or idiosyncratic jumps. For comparison, we also report the results of CJS.
the model with no catastrophic and no idiosyncratic jumps (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0). As with
CJS, this model is calibrated to match option prices and the 5 year CDX index (and thus,
it matches 5-year risk neutral expected losses). However, without idiosyncratic jumps, this
model generates short horizon CDX index spreads that are well below observation. As such,
expected losses are \backloaded", implying that the buyer of equity protection pays too much
premium for too long, in turn biasing down the estimate for the equity tranche spread. Since
the model is calibrated to match expected losses, this downward bias on the equity tranche
spread automatically biases upward spreads on the more senior tranches.
To see how important this backloading issue is, we determine the CDX index spreads for
maturities of 1-4 years for each of the models. The results are displayed in Table 4. For
example, we nd that the (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0) model predicts credit spreads of 0bp and 3bp at
maturities of 1 and 2 years, respectively, well below the market quotes of 13bp and 20bp.
Adding idiosyncratic jumps calibrated to match short horizon credit spreads not only solves
the backloading problem, but it also generates a ve-year loss distribution that is more peaked
about the risk-neutral expected losses of 2.4%. Indeed, the standard deviation of the loss
distribution without idiosyncratic jumps (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0) has a standard deviation of 2.9%,
whereas the standard deviation of the loss distribution with idiosyncratic jumps (Q
C
= 0) has
a standard deviation of 1.7%. The implication is that adding idiosyncratic jumps generates a
smaller probability of losses falling into the more senior tranches, pushing their spreads down,
and in turn the equity tranche spread up.
Thus, the downward bias of the equity tranche spread in the (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0) model has
two sources: one due to backloading, and one due to an error in the idiosyncratic risk/systematic
risk composition. In an attempt to decompose this bias into its components, we approximate
the backloading bias by treating losses as deterministic, and equal to the risk-neutral expected
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losses implied in Table 4. Note that this approach will produce an equity tranche spread that
is biased upward for each model, since this approach does not cut o losses at the equity
detachment point of 3%. As such, we focus not on the levels generated by this approximation,
but rather on the dierence in levels across these two models. Specically, we assume that the
term structure of loss rates is piecewise constant over the intervals (0-1 year), (1-2 year), (2-3
year), (3-4 year), and (4-5 year). The loss rates are chosen to perfectly match the implied term
structure of credit spreads in Table 4. After these loss rates are determined, they are used
to calculate the protection leg and premium leg of the tranche using equations (13) and (14).
Calibrated to actual data on the term structure of CDX spreads (row 1 in table 4), we nd
the equity tranche spread equals 1929bp. In contrast, calibrated to the term structure of CDX
spreads implied by our (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0) model (row 5 in table 4), the equity tranche spread
is only 1692bp. While both of these levels are biased upward by our approximation technique,
the dierence between these two estimates, 237bp, provides an estimate for the amount of
downward bias in the equity tranche spread that can be attributed to backloading.
If we start with the case (Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0), and then add idiosyncratic jumps to match
the term structure of CDX index spreads, we get the model (Q
C
= 0), the results of which
are shown in the third line of Table 3. Interestingly, we nd in this case that the predicted
equity tranche spread is actually too high { implying a problem opposite to that reported by
CJS. Since the backloading problem has been resolved in this case, these results imply that the
(Q
C
= 0) model is too peaked { that is, has too high a ratio of idiosyncratic risk to systematic
risk. But this problem is easily resolved by adding a catastrophic jump calibrated to match
the super-senior tranche spread (which produces our Benchmark model). As shown previously,
including a catastrophic jump has virtually no impact on the model's ability to match option
prices.
In summary then, we nd that in order to estimate tranche spreads, it is necessary that
the model be calibrated to match the term structure of credit spreads. Specifying a model
with idiosyncratic dynamics driven only by diusive risks generates a model where the timing
of defaults is backloaded. This causes counter-factually low spreads/losses at short maturities,
which in turn biases down the equity tranche spread. In addition, the super-senior tranche
spread (and therefore, spreads on other senior tranches) cannot be extrapolated from option
prices alone. However, spreads on other tranches can be interpolated reasonably well given
option prices and super-senior tranche spreads. We conclude, in contrast with the results of
CJS, that S&P 500 options and CDX tranche prices market can be fairly well reconciled within
our arbitrage-free model. In that sense these two markets appear to be well integrated.
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1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year
Data 13 20 28 36 45
Benchmark 13 20 28 36 45
Q
C
= 0 13 20 28 36 45
Q
i
= 0 6 7 16 29 45
(Q
C
= 0, Q
i
= 0) 0 3 13 28 45
Table 4: Historical and model-estimated average CDX index spreads September 2004 - Septem-
ber 2007 for four dierent models: i) benchmark, ii) benchmark without catastrophic jump,
iii) benchmark without idiosyncratic jumps, iv) benchmark without either catastrophic jump
or idiosyncratic jumps.
4.2 Time-series of tranche spreads
In the previous section we showed that our benchmark model is able to t average historical
spreads across all tranches very well, once it is calibrated to match the term structure of
CDX index spreads and the super-senior claim. In this section we investigate its time-series
performance.
For Series 3 to Series 9, we keep the parameters for the option pricing model xed as given
in Table 1 \Estimates 2". For Series 10, we use the parameter values from the column labeled
\Estimate 4". Then, for each week, we use option prices to identify the state variables Vt and
t . The time-series of the RMSE are provided in Figure 7. In addition, each week we calibrate
the intensity of the catastrophic jump to match the super-senior tranche, and the idiosyncratic
jump intensities to match the term structure of CDX index spreads with maturities of one-year
to ve-years. The time series for the CDX indices and the super-senior tranche used by our
calibration exercise are shown in Figure 8.
With this calibration, we then estimate tranche spreads. The results (which we consider
to be the main contribution of this paper) are given in Figure 9. Consistent with the time-
averaged results, the picture reveals a dramatic improvement in t relative to that proposed
by CJS.20 Note that the performance is somewhat better during the pre-crisis period than the
crisis period. For example, the model-implied 7-10% mezzanine tranche spread is too low, and
the 15-30% senior tranche spread is too high during the crisis. Interestingly, even if we set the
catastrophic jump to zero, the implied senior tranche spread remains too high during the crisis
period. This is due to the very high implied volatilities on the deep out of the money puts on
the S&P 500 options.21 Once again, we are condent that we could improve the t of these
20We do not plot the super-senior tranche since it is t perfectly by construction.
21One possible cause is that we specify market equity dynamics as log-normal to simplify equity option pricing,
even though theoretically it would be better to model market asset dynamics as log-normal (Toft and Prucyk
(1997)). While straightforward to model, such a framework would be computationally less tractable. We leave
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tranche spreads if we were to use them as part of the calibration procedure, but that is not the
purpose of this exercise. We feel that the overall t demonstrated in Figure 9 is quite good,
and very much consistent with the belief that the S&P 500 option market and CDX tranche
market are well-integrated.
Of course, our results only show that at every point in time it is possible to nd an arbitrage-
free model that consistently prices (in the cross-section) S&P500 options, the CDX index and
CDX tranches. However, our model is not time-consistent, as we recalibrate certain parameters
(such as the crash jump intensities) which within the model are assumed to be constant. It
would be interesting to see if the model can be made time consistent by, for example, allowing
for time-varying intensities or partial learning as in Cogley and Sargent (2008). We leave these
interesting questions for future research.
5 Robustness
For parsimony, many simplifying assumptions were made in the previous sections, such as i)
rm homogeneity, ii) no changes in capital structure, iii) uncorrelated idiosyncratic shocks (i.e.,
\no industry eects"), iv) constant rm-level asset dividend yield, even though market equity
dividend yield is stochastic, and v) constant interest rates. Here we show that our results are
robust to these assumptions.
We investigate deviations from our benchmark model along several dimensions. For each
deviation, we continue to calibrate the model to 5-year option implied volatilities, 1-5 year
CDX indices, and the super-senior tranche spreads. Then we report model implied tranche
spreads. The results are given in Table 5. Examples include:
 Dynamic capital structure: We assume that if a rm performs well, it will issue additional
debt, in turn raising the default boundary (e.g., Goldstein, Leland and Ju (2001)). Specif-
ically, we specify default boundary dynamics AB (t) via: AB (t+dt) = max[AB (t); c A(t)],
where we set the constant c to the initial leverage ratio divided by 1.1. Thus, the default
boundary remains constant until rm value increases by at least 10% from its initial
value. The result is reported in the rst row as `Dynamic capital structure'.
 Stochastic asset dividend yield at the rm level: We specify the rm payout ratio as
A(t) = A+ (t  ), where A = 0:05 is the average payout ratio, and  = 0:7 measures
the correlation of dynamics of the rm payout ratio and market dividend-price ratio. We
choose a value of  to be less than one to account for the fact that we anticipate equity
this interesting question for future research.
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dividend yields to be more volatile than yields on the asset, since coupon payments are
stickier than dividend payments.
 Constant market equity dividend yield: we specify market dynamics using the SVCJ
option model so that both the market dividend price ratio and the rm payout ratio are
constants in this scenario. The purpose of this robustness check is to emphasize that our
results are not being driven by the (non-stationary) dynamics on the dividend yield.
 Heterogeneity in initial credit spreads: We use our model to back out the default bound-
aries for each rm based on their average 5-year CDS spreads in the on-the-run period
of Series 4. The 5-year CDS spreads are from Datastream. The cross-sectional mean
and the standard deviation of the log default boundaries are -1.59 and 0.344. Instead of
specifying a homogenous initial leverage ratio for all rms as in the benchmark model,
here we specify a distribution for the log default boundaries of the 125 rms using a
normal distribution with the above parameters.
 Stochastic interest rates: We specify the spot rate to follow Vasciek (1977) interest rates
and calibrate the model to the average term structure of treasury rates for maturities
3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 3-year and 5-year for pre-crisis sample period. We
assume the interest rate process is independent of any other random shock in the model
to simplify the calibration. The option model with the Vasciek-type stochastic interest
rate is still ane, so that we can use the FFT to solve for option prices.
 Industry Correlations: Our benchmark model assumes a CAPM-like structure, where
there is only market and idiosyncratic risk. It is straightforward to include other sources
of risks that are shared by only a fraction of the 125 rms, capturing the notion that
industry correlations may be stronger than a CAPM calibration would predict. As a
simple way to capture this feature, we assume that there are approximately two rms
per industry with dynamics that are perfectly correlated. As such, instead of modeling
125 rms, we consider only 60 \industries".
We see that, while these dierent assumptions do impact tranche spreads, they are of
second-order importance compared to the need to calibrate the model to the term structure of
CDX index spreads and the super-senior tranche spread. We interpret these ndings to imply
that our results are robust along many dierent dimensions.
22
0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-15% 15-30% 30-100% 0-3% Upfrt
data 1472 135 37 17 8 4 0.34
benchmark 1449 113 25 13 8 4 0.33
Dynamic capital structure 1452 116 27 14 8 4 0.34
Stochastic rm payout 1441 122 29 14 9 4 0.33
SVCJ 1330 138 47 26 12 4 0.30
Heterogeneous initial credit spreads 1406 133 28 13 8 4 0.32
Stochastic short-term rate 1484 114 22 11 8 4 0.36
Industry Correlations 1370 153 31 16 10 5 0.31
Table 5: Robustness check
6 Conclusion
We examine the relative pricing of long-maturity S&P 500 option prices and CDX tranche
spreads. We demonstrate the importance of calibrating the model to match the entire term
structure of CDX index spreads because it contains pertinent information regarding both the
timing of expected defaults and the specication of idiosyncratic dynamics. In particular,
consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984)), jumps must
be added to idiosyncratic dynamics in order to explain credit spreads at short maturities. With
this calibration approach, we nd our model matches historical tranche prices extremely well,
both in time series and in the cross section. In contrast to the conclusions of Coval, Jurek and
Staord (2009), we conclude that S&P 500 options and CDX tranche prices market can be
reconciled within an arbitrage-free framework. In that sense these two markets appear to be
well integrated.
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Figure 2: Market dynamics given in equations (1)-(3) are calibrated to match ve year option
prices obtained from CJS during the pre-crisis period. The parameters are specied in the
columns labeled \Estimation 1" and \Estimation 2" of Table 1. Figure 2A shows the model-
implied ve year volatility surface and the actual option prices as a function of moneyness
for both the benchmark case where there is a catastrophic jump, and the case where there is
not. Figure 2B converts these two implied volatility surfaces into risk-neutral distributions for
the ve-year level of market value. For comparison, Figure 2C demonstrates the risk-neutral
distribution from CJS.
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Figure 3: Market dynamics given in equations (1)-(3) are calibrated to match ve year option
prices obtained from CJS during the crisis period. The parameters are specied in the columns
labeled \Estimation 3" and \Estimation 4" of Table 1. Figure 3A shows the model-implied
ve year volatility surface and the actual option prices as a function of moneyness for both the
benchmark case where there is a catastrophic jump, and the case where there is not. Figure
3B converts these two implied volatility surfaces into risk-neutral distributions for the ve-year
level of market value.
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Figure 4: In Figure 4A, we plot the risk-neutral loss density for the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
The crisis period has higher expected losses and a less-peaked distribution due to a larger
proportion of risk being systematic. In Figure 4B, we plot the dierence in the cumulative loss
distributions for the crisis and pre-crisis periods.
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Figure 5: The time-series of the standard deviation of the systematic and idiosyncratic risk for
the rm value. The systematic risk is measured as the asset beta times the standard deviation
of the market diusion and jumps implied by S&P 500 options and CDX super-senior tranche.
The idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic diusion and
jump implied by 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 year CDX indices.
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Figure 6: The time series of the ratio of implied default boundary to book value of debt. Many
strands of literature predict that this ratio should be signicantly less than unity.
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Figure 7: The time-series of the implied dividend yield t, the implied market variance Vt, and
the relative RMSE of the option implied volatilities. We x the parameters that are chosen
to match the 5-year options, and calibrate the two state variables, the dividend yield and the
market variance for each date to minimizing the relative RMSE of the option with moneyness
from 0.7 to 1 with 0.05 increments.
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Figure 8: Historical time series of spreads for the one-year, two-year, three-year, four-year and
ve-year CDX indices, and the time series of the 30-100% super-senior tranche. Our benchmark
model is calibrated to perfectly match these time series.
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Figure 9: Three time series of spreads for the 0-3% up-front premium, 0-3% running premium,
3-7%, 7-10%, 10-15%, 15-30% CDX tranches. The smooth (blue) lines are the historical data.
The dashed (red) lines are the spreads implied by our model. The dot-dashed (black) lines are
the spreads implied by CJS.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Fundamental of the Mean-Diverting Dividend Yield
Slightly modifying their notation, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) specify the utility function
of the representative agent in an exchange economy as
U(Ct ; bCt ; t) = e t

C   bC1    1
1   ; (17)
where bC is an exogenous habit. Campbell-Cochrane dene the surplus consumption ratio as
S 

C  bC
C

. For convenience, they also dene the logarithms of consumption and surplus
consumption via
c  logC and s  logS:
Because the dividend is perishable and there are no investment opportunities, it follows that
in equilibrium consumption equals the dividend payment. Further, the pricing kernel is equal
to the marginal utility of the representative agent:
t = UC (Ct ;
bCt ; t)
= e t

C   bC 
= e t e  s e  c: (18)
In continuous time their log-consumption and surplus consumption processes are:
dc = gc dt+ c dz (19)
ds = (s  s) dt+ 

1
S
p
1  2(s  s)  1

dz; (20)
where the constants S and smax are
S  
r


(21)
smax  s+
1
2

1  S2

: (22)
From Ito's lemma, pricing kernel dynamics follow
d

=  r dt  
S
p
1  2(s  s) dz: (23)
Girsanov's theorem then implies that one can identify the risk-neutral measure by rewriting
dynamics in terms of
dzQ = dz +


S
p
1  2(s  s)

dt (24)
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Plugging this into equation (20), we nd that the coecient in the drift multiplying the term
linear in s goes from   under the historical measure to + under the risk-neutral measure.
This non-stationary feature motivates our market dynamics in equations (1)-(3).
7.2 Numerical solution of the long-term option model
We add two ingredients to the standard SVCJ option model. First, stochastic dividends are
introduced to match the long-term options. Second, a catastrophe jump is introduced to match
the super-senior tranche (30-100%) of the CDX. The dynamics are
dmt =

r   t   yQ   (eyC   1) 
1
2
Vt

dt+
p
Vt dw
Q
1
+ y dq + yC dqC
dVt = V (
V   Vt)dt+ V
p
Vt(dw
Q
1
+
p
1  2dw2) + yV dq
dt = (
   t) dt+ 
p
Vt(1 dw
Q
1
+ 2 dw2 +
q
1  2
1
  2
2
dw3) + y dq:
The stochastic dividend yield t is allowed to be negative, meaning nancing. Since the dy-
namics are ane, the moment generating function of the log market is
T (u) = E
Q [eumT ] = eA(T )+um0+B(T )V0+C(T )0 ;
where A(t); B(t); C(t) solves the ODEs,
A0(t) = (r   yQ   (eyC   1)QC )u+ V V B(t) +  C(t) + QE
h
euy+B(t)yV +C(t)y   1
i
+(eu yC   1)Q
C
B0(t) =  1
2
u+
1
2
u2   V B(t) +
1
2
2
V
B(t)2 +
1
2
2

C(t)2 + V B(t)u
+(1 + 2
p
1  2)V B(t)C(t) + 1uC(t)
C 0(t) =  u  

C(t);
where
E
h
euy+B(t)yV +C(t)y   1
i
=
euy+
1
2
u22
y
+C(t)
d
+ 1
2
C(t)22
d
1  V (B(t) + uq)
  1:
We can apply the FFT to the characteristic function T (iv) to get the risk-neutral market
distribution at time T , and use the distribution to price European options. Details about the
FFT application on option pricing can be found in Carr and Madan(1999).
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